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Book Reviews
RACE MATTERS
SHOULD RACE MATTER?: UNUSUAL ANSWERS
TO THE USUAL QUESTIONS. By David Boonin.1
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. vii +
441. $99.00 (cloth), $34.99 (paper).
2

Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild

3

One frequently hears that America has a race problem. We
agree, but the race problem we identify is not what is usually
meant by those who invoke it. It is not discrimination,
intentional or otherwise, but rather obsession with race that is
America’s more consequential “race problem” today. America
has vanquished slavery, segregation, and long-standing racial
discrimination only to succumb to an almost equally destructive
race obsession. Despite the biological arbitrariness of dividing a
single, interbreeding biological species into “races,” despite the
sorry history legally and socially of the use of race, and despite
the Civil Rights Movement’s original ambition to substitute the
content of character for the color of skin as the basis of decision
making, America today is in many ways as race conscious as it
was in the era of Jim Crow.
For that reason we welcome David Boonin’s Should Race
Matter? Boonin takes up five topics that constitute a good
portion of the current obsession—reparations, affirmative
action, hate speech, hate crimes, and profiling—and he subjects
each to philosophical scrutiny. Boonin is sober and fair-minded
in tone, and purports to be careful and comprehensive in
method. Unlike many discussions of race, Boonin’s tries to shed

1. Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado.
2. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
3. Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
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light, not heat. He deserves to be read by everyone who takes a
serious interest in public policy as it bears on race.
Boonin’s book has its limitations, as we will suggest.
Moreover, Boonin discusses only race, not sex, ethnicity,
nationality, religion, disability, or sexual preference, although
most of the policies he considers have been urged or actually
extended beyond race to some or all of these other categories.
Nonetheless, Boonin’s analyses of these policies as they bear on
race would have direct implications for these other categories.
Given that Boonin takes 350 pages to examine five racial
policies, we think limiting his focus to race was quite justifiable.
Although we believe Boonin’s is a worthwhile treatment of
contemporary racial policies, we take issue with him on several
points. We think that his arguments in support of affirmative
action and hate crimes are incomplete and thus unpersuasive,
and we consider his case for reparations a failure on its own
terms. Nonetheless, we admire the effort at fair-mindedness and
the care with which he makes the case for these policies.
I. HATE SPEECH
We begin with the topic on which Boonin and we are in full
agreement: hate speech. Boonin is opposed to bans on racial
“hate speech” because he believes such bans can only be
justified by repudiating current free speech doctrines that we
would and should be loath to reject. In his exemplary twochapter discussion of the issue, he canvasses the major rationales
that are offered to support bans on racial hate speech and finds
them all wanting. In the first chapter on this subject (Chapter
Six), Boonin analyzes arguments that try to assimilate racial hate
speech to categories of expression that are already deemed
unprotected speech by today’s constitutional free speech
doctrines. Not all racial hate speech is a true threat; and true
threats are already prohibited (pp. 210–13). Not every instance
of racial hate speech constitutes “fighting words,” which are
insults rendered face to face and likely to provoke a violent
4
response (pp. 216-17). Racial hate speech cannot be assimilated
to the libel of some corporate entity (pp. 217–25), nor is every
instance of it a case of actionable harassment (pp. 226–29). In
4. Boonin also expresses reservations about the moral case for banning fighting
words: the rationale for banning fighting words extends to legitimate commentary on
public policy, and it unjustifiably places the responsibility for altercation on the speaker
rather than his audience (pp. 213–16).
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sum, a broad ban on racial hate speech could not be justified
under current free speech doctrines.
In Chapter Seven, Boonin then considers and rejects
justifications for banning racial hate speech as such, rather than
as instances of other categories of legally unprotected
expression. “Words that wound” is a justification that sweeps in
far too much expression that a free society would want to protect
(pp. 230–36). Nor can hate speech be properly construed as a
“subordinating speech act” (pp. 236–41): either the speaker lacks
the authority required to subordinate, or the notion of authority
has to be expanded to the point where speech that almost
everyone would want to protect would be deemed subordinating. Finally, hate speech cannot be banned on the ground
that it “silences” without again sweeping in lots of quite
legitimate speech (pp. 241–45).
At the conclusion of Chapter Seven, Boonin asks whether
the fact, if it is so, that hate speech wounds, subordinates, and
silences makes a case for banning it even though each of those
harms, individually, would not do so (pp. 245–48). He compares
a white student’s calling a black student a “nigger” in the
presence of other students with a Catholic student’s publicly
calling another Catholic student a “dangerous heretic” for
supporting abortion and gay rights. He concludes that if the first
student’s speech wounds, subordinates, and silences, the second
student’s can do so as well. If the second student’s speech should
be protected—and Boonin believes that it surely should be—
then so, too, should the first student’s. The “combination” of
harms justification for hate speech bans fails.
Depending on the circumstances, the first student’s speech
might be banned as “fighting words” under well-established
constitutional law. But in principle, we are in agreement with
Boonin on the issue of hate speech. Arguments for hate speech
bans consist of some normative premise (speech with
characteristic X should not be protected as free speech) and a
factual premise (racial hate speech has characteristic X). In
Chapter Six Boonin takes on arguments in which the factual
premise fails to hold. In Chapter Seven he takes on arguments in
which the normative premise fails. Although racial hate speech is
ugly and regrettable, so too is much other speech. The power to
cleanse public dialogue of ugly and hurtful speech is a dangerous
power that, for reasons Boonin adumbrates, would likely be
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used either selectively in a divisive, partisan way, or much too
5
broadly.
II. RACIAL PROFILING
In the final two chapters of the book, Boonin examines the
vexed topic of racial profiling. In the book’s penultimate chapter
he asks whether racial profiling is rational, and he concludes that
it can be. In the final chapter he asks whether racial profiling,
even if rational, is nonetheless immoral, and he concludes that it
is not. With some qualifications regarding the moral question,
we believe Boonin is essentially correct in both chapters.
In thinking about the rationality of racial profiling, it is
6
useful to be clear about what profiling is. When we profile or
stereotype—these are essentially synonymous—we use a given
trait that is relatively easy to identify as a proxy for the trait in
which we are ultimately interested. The relation between the
proxy trait and the target trait is a probabilistic one. The
existence of the proxy trait makes it more likely that the person
who possesses it has the target trait than a person picked at
random. The rationality of using a given proxy trait depends
upon its correlation with the target trait and the relative costs
and benefits of using a different proxy or a more refined proxy
that has a higher correlation with the target trait. But there is no
question but that using proxy traits to predict target traits is
5. It is a shame that Boonin wrote his book prior to the publication of Jeremy
Waldron’s book on hate speech, a book that has already received considerable scholarly
attention. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); see also Brian
Leiter, Book Review (reviewing WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH), Notre Dame
Philosophical Reviews, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/32077-the-harm-in-hate-speech/ (2012)).
Waldron supports bans on written but not oral hate speech. The principal harm that
Waldron believes supports such a ban is not the offense or hurt felt by its targets,
whether from the mere presence of the written words or, more realistically, from the
knowledge that there are some among one’s fellow citizens who hold the views
expressed. Rather, the real harm is the insecurity regarding one’s status in society caused
by the fear that the visible expression of such views might persuade others to hold them
as well.
Although we can only guess at how Boonin would respond to Waldron’s argument,
he would probably argue that we do and should protect “illiberal speech,” speech that
takes issue with the fundamental values of liberal society, including equality. Of course,
free speech extended to protect illiberal ideas exposes an oft-noted paradox: free speech
protects speech that rejects the normative basis of free speech. For an argument against
free speech protection for some illiberal speech, see Carl. A. Auerbach, The Communist
Control Acts of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 173 (1956). On the paradox more generally, see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 147–81 (2005).
6. An excellent treatment of this topic is found in FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003).
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rational. Indeed, we must do it, for we must act on the basis of
imperfect information about others all the time. It is not only
insurance companies predicting our life expectancy, our health,
or our traffic accidents, or political pollsters predicting our likely
votes, or sociologists predicting behavior more generally who
must rely on proxies. All of us do, all the time. It is inconceivable
that we could dispense with proxies, so the rationality of their
use is beyond question.
That still leaves open the question of whether the use of
race as a proxy is ever rational. Race is, after all, an imprecise
characteristic, and its use will require some arbitrary judgments.
Nonetheless, despite the arbitrary boundaries of the proxy, in
some contexts its use can be quite rational. If one is testing for
sickle cell anemia, it makes sense to focus on persons who
appear to be descended from the pre-colonial peoples of subSaharan Africa, just as if one is testing for Tay-Sachs, it makes
sense to focus on Ashkenazi Jews. And even those who purport
to object to racial profiling probably take greater precautions for
their personal safety when in some neighborhoods rather than
others, with the racial or ethnic composition of the neighborhood serving as their proxy for relative dangerousness.
Of course, if there are more predictive proxies available at a
low enough cost to obtain—or if, again at a cost-benefit justified
cost to obtain, there are ways to refine the proxy by combining it
with other traits—then race will cease to be the most rational
proxy for its purpose. A neighborhood’s ethnic makeup might be
less predictive of danger than its wealth or poverty. Or its
economics combined with its racial makeup may be more
predictive than either proxy by itself.
Boonin’s focus is on a paradigmatic use of racial profiling:
the decision by the police to stop, among drivers who are
violating traffic laws, a disproportionate number of black
offenders on the ground that they are more likely than the
average offender to be committing drug or weapons offenses. If
it is true that they are more likely than average to be committing
these offenses, and given the finite resources of the police, then
Boonin concludes that this type of racial profiling is rational.
Boonin first considers some arguments that contest the
claim that black drivers are more likely to be committing drug or
weapons offenses, and he finds them to be unsound (pp. 308–19).
Boonin then considers some arguments against such profiling’s
rationality that do not rest on the denial that black drivers are
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more likely than others to be committing drug or weapons
offenses. One such argument, the “elasticity” argument, posits
that profiling blacks will lead to an increase in crime by whites,
so that there will be no net decrease in crime or increase in the
percentage of criminals caught offending (pp. 319–23). (This is
why rational profilers, like El Al’s security agents, do not
publicize the profiles they employ.) Another such argument is
that racial profiling will not be implemented rationally and will
be used when proxies more predictive than race or race alone
are available (pp. 323–25).
Boonin believes, and we agree, that the “elasticity” and
“over use” objections are cogent and may render many instances
of racial profiling irrational. Nonetheless, he concludes,
correctly, that racial profiling can sometimes be rational (pp.
325–26).
Boonin’s last chapter examines racial profiling’s morality
given its rationality. Boonin concludes that even though racial
profiling burdens the proxy group—in this case, black drivers—
more than others, it is not for this reason immoral. Boonin
points out that if racial profiling is rational, it will yield more
arrests for serious offenses per drivers stopped than would
random stops. It does so at the cost of disproportionately
burdening black drivers, most of whom will be innocent. But that
fact will not render the profiling immoral.
Boonin’s defense of the morality of the disproportionate
racial burden consists of an argument by analogy (pp. 342–47).
He asks us to imagine a city that is 75% white and 25% black.
He then imagines that there is a pipe leak that will require
shutting down one or the other of two streets. On one street live
100 people, 50 white and 50 black. On the other street live 120
people, 90 white and 30 black. He argues that everyone would
(and should) agree that it would be proper to shut down the less
populated street, even though doing so will disproportionately
burden blacks. Or, again in the same city, suppose there is an
incident of rioting and looting, and two vans are fleeing the
scene, one with three whites and one black, the other three
whites and three blacks, and the police can only pursue one of
the vans. Boonin asserts that everyone would (and should) agree
that it would be proper to pursue the van with more looters in it,
even if it includes a disproportionate number of blacks.
In principle, we agree with Boonin about the morality of
racial profiling. We think, however, that Boonin’s discussion of
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its morality, as opposed to its rationality, is incomplete. First,
Boonin should have distinguished the use of race to predict
voluntary conduct from its use to predict some matter beyond
voluntary control. People have a different reaction when they
are disadvantaged by a prediction of their voluntary conduct
from their reaction when they are disadvantaged by a prediction
of some natural event over which they lack control. To tell a
male that he is paying a higher life insurance premium than a
comparable female because males do not live as long on average
will elicit a shrug of the shoulders. To tell a female that she is not
getting the job despite otherwise having credentials slightly
better than her male competitor because women are on average
much more likely to quit at an early age in order to have
children will likely elicit outrage. “I can control whether I quit,”
she will rightly say, “and if I say I won’t, I won’t.” The employer
may respond that his statistics are predictive even for women
who at the time they are hired insist they won’t quit. Yet that
will not likely stanch the woman’s sense that she has been
deemed “guilty by association” because of the conduct of other
women, conduct that she feels confident she won’t emulate.
Disadvantaging predictions based on sociological
generalizations—i.e., profiles, stereotypes—have a different feel
and elicit a different reaction from those based on the natural
sciences, the truths of which are not hostage to our choices. This
is not to deny that sociological predictions can be quite accurate.
Political polling is now quite good at predicting election
outcomes, and the National Safety Council is uncannily accurate
in predicting traffic deaths on holiday weekends.
Racial profiling is based on sociological generalizations, not
natural scientific ones, which at least partly explains the negative
reactions it provokes. This is not to deny its legitimacy in some
situations, especially if, unlike the denial of a job, it results in
only a temporary intrusion on the innocent. Nonetheless, we
wish Boonin would have discussed this specific aspect of racial
profiling in his discussion of its morality. For in the absence of
that discussion, his case for its morality will seem to many to be
7
incomplete.

7. For a discussion of the use of sociological predictions in the context of
antidiscrimination norms, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 168–73
(1992).
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There is yet another aspect of the moral case for profiling
that merits discussion. Finite resources will often require
selectivity in investigating criminal or terrorist activity. The
criteria for selection will mean that some innocents will be
burdened and thus sacrificed to some degree for the benefit of
everyone else. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the
criteria for selectivity are racial, ethnic, religious, or even
8
completely random.
Finally, racial profiling is often yoked to other practices that
make profiling even more problematic than it would be in
isolation. Boonin’s paradigm of racial profiling is the decision by
the police to stop, among drivers who are violating traffic laws, a
disproportionate number of black offenders on the ground that
they are more likely than the average traffic offender to be
committing drug or weapons offenses. But if the traffic laws “on
the books” are almost never enforced as written, then the police
already exercise essentially unlimited discretion about whom to
stop, and indeed about whom to charge with a violation. Posted
speed limits, at least in many states, are an example. This alone
has corrosive implications for the idea of the rule of law. If
virtually unbounded police discretion is linked to racial profiling,
it is almost inevitable that disproportionately targeted groups
will feel that they are the object of unjust racial discrimination in
9
law enforcement.
In the abstract, we think the moral case for racial profiling
might be no weaker than it is for random stops or interrogations.
The historical baggage of racial discrimination and harassment
makes many Americans especially wary of racial profiling,
however, and understandably so. We favor a presumption
against racial profiling, but a presumption which could be
overridden for sufficient practical reasons, depending on the
circumstances. We are also open to the idea that the moral case
for investigatory intrusions, whether based on profiles or at
8. Ex post, those investigated will always have had a 100% chance of being
investigated, even if they were selected based on drawing numbers from a hat. For
example, assume ten numbers drawn from 100 numbers in a hat represent the traffic
stops that will result in a search for drugs and weapons, or the specific passengers going
through airport security who will be subjected to interrogation. It makes no difference
whether those numbers are drawn at the time of the stops or were drawn hours, days, or
years before. In either case, if, say, 23 is the number for a stop with a search, then driver
or traveler 23 had a 100% chance of suffering the extra burden, whether he or anyone
else knew that ahead of time.
9. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011) for exceptionally thoughtful, well-informed, and troubling reflections on this and
related matters.
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random, might be strengthened if those burdened and who are
innocent of the activities that are the target were given a small
token of gratitude for bearing a burden for the benefit of the
public—perhaps a voucher of some kind depending on how
intrusive or burdensome the investigation. Indeed, in Boonin’s
example of a street closure, regardless of the racial makeup of
the street closed, it would seem only fair for those on the streets
left open to contribute something to those on the street that is
closed.
III. HATE CRIMES
In contrast to his positions on hate speech and profiling,
Boonin finds nothing problematic about hate crimes—ordinary
crimes, the punishment for which is increased if committed
because of race, sex, religion, and so forth. Although such hate
crime enhancements may be morally justifiable, we do not
believe Boonin’s arguments are sufficient to make that case.
We begin with those points on which we agree with Boonin.
We agree with him that, however drawn, the distinction between
intention and motive is immaterial in assessing a criminal’s
desert (pp. 258–73). Moreover, we agree that a criminal’s
negative desert can be increased both by the harms he believes
10
his act may cause and by his reasons for acting.
Boonin believes that hate crime enhancements are
justifiable because hate crimes can both cause more harm and
also reflect more culpable motivation than the underlying crime
10. Specifically, we believe criminal desert is a function of culpability, and
culpability is a function of (1) the perceived risks of various harms and (2) the reasons for
imposing those risks. With respect to (1), the greater the harm and the greater the
perceived risk of its occurring, the greater the actor’s culpability. With respect to (2), a
distinction should be made between justifying reasons and motivating reasons. Justifying
reasons are facts the actor believes exist, discounted by his perception of their
probability, that would justify his imposing the risk of harm he believes his act will
impose. If those facts, discounted by their probability, justify the risk of harm, then the
actor’s act is not culpable, even if he is not motivated by the justifying facts. If, for
example, the actor believes turning the trolley will save the lives of five trapped workers
but likely kill one trapped worker on the siding, his turning the trolley will be morally
permissible and thus nonculpable even if he is not motivated by saving the five and is
motivated only by his desire to kill the one. On the other hand, if his imposing the risk is
not justifiable in light of the justifying facts he believes exist, then his motivating reasons
can render it more or less culpable. A person who drives at high speed through a school
zone will, in the absence of special circumstances, be acting culpably. But his culpability
will be lower if he is merely impatient but hopes not to injure anyone than if he is
speeding with the hope of injuring or killing children. On these points, see LARRY
ALEXANDER , ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 23–65
(2009).
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itself (pp. 274–83). We find Boonin’s arguments in support of
these claims unpersuasive.
Hate crime laws can be of different types. One type focuses
on the criterion by which the defendant chose his victim. Did he,
for example, choose a black victim in whole or in part because
he was black? Another type focuses not on the criterion of
selection but on the underlying reason for the selection, such as a
belief that blacks are not due equal concern, or a visceral dislike
of blacks.
Boonin focuses on the first type, the criterion of selection
form of hate crime. He thinks that such a crime—say, a murder
in which the victim was selected because he was black—can be
more harmful than an “ordinary” murder because it can create
greater fear (pp. 280–81). But on that criterion, is it true?
Does a serial killer who kills only blacks cause more harm
than a serial killer whose victims are chosen at random and are
of all races? It is difficult to see why that would be the case. A
serial killer on the loose whose victims could be anyone would
presumably cause fear throughout the entire community,
whereas one whose victims were only of one race would cause
fear only in a racial sub-community. Moreover, a serial killer
who targets groups with large populations—e.g., whites, or
anyone regardless of race—might, by the logic of quantum of
fear caused, be committing more serious crimes than one who
targets smaller groups—e.g., blacks—or very small ones, such as
the Roma.
Most hate crime statutes, moreover, include sex as one of
the enhancing categories. Does a heterosexual rapist, who rapes
only women, cause more harm or create more fear than a
bisexual rapist, who rapes both men and women? What would
be the argument that he does? In practice, if sex is an enhancing
category, virtually all rapes or sexual assaults could be
categorized as “hate crimes.” It is far from clear that such an
across-the-board enhancement of existing penalties would really
be desirable on this basis.
Of course, pointing out the implications of hate crime
enhancements based on the quantum of fear caused is not to
deny that secondary harms, such as fear, that the defendant
realizes he might be causing, might affect the level of his
culpability. But it does suggest that if fear is their rationale, hate
crime statutes are woefully underinclusive. Suppose there are
more blondes or more lawyers than there are members of some
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racial groups. A killer who targets blondes or lawyers will
presumably then be worse than a killer who targets, say, Roma.
But hate crime statutes do not make victims’ hair color or
occupation a basis for punishment enhancement.
The amount of harm risked is but one part of the culpability
calculus. The other is the reason for which the actor imposes that
risk—his motive for doing so. As we said, we agree with Boonin
that there is no relevant distinction to be drawn in terms of
culpability between the actor’s intention and his motive. We also
believe, with Boonin, that motivating reasons affect culpability.
The killer who kills out of hatred for the victim and the killer
who kills out of mercy for the victim both intentionally kill their
victims, but the former is surely more culpable than the latter.
Finally, we agree with Boonin in rejecting Heidi Hurd’s
argument that basing punishment on motives punishes character,
which is not under one’s voluntary control, rather than choice
(pp. 284–87). As Boonin quite rightly responds, although we
cannot, at the time of action, choose the reasons for which we
act, we can nevertheless choose whether, given those reasons, we
act or refrain from acting. Punishment based on the defendant’s
reasons is not punishment for an involuntary status.
So we are with Boonin to this point with respect to the
legitimacy of varying punishment based on the defendant’s
reasons for acting. The question for the hate crime proponent,
however, is whether killing because of racial animosity is really
worse than the myriad other reasons that might motivate a killer.
How about killing people because they are ugly or stupid? How
about killings based on thoroughgoing misanthropy? We can
think of all sorts of reasons for committing crimes that might be
as bad as or even worse than racial animosity or those other
specific forms of animosity that hate crime statutes pick out.
Boonin acknowledges the underinclusiveness charge. His
response to it is that “[w]hat matters is that a crime committed
from a racially biased mental state is a worse crime than one that
isn’t but that resembles the first crime in all other respects” (p.
282, emphasis added). The problem, however, is that when we
remove the racially biased mental state, we have to substitute for
it some other reason why the defendant committed the crime.
We cannot just compare the hate crime to an objectively similar
crime committed for no reason whatsoever. Every crime will be
motivated by some reason. Some will be less heinous than racial
bias, others might be more heinous. The latter “resemble” the
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hate crime as much as the former. The underinclusiveness charge
still stands.
Indeed, whether harm-based or motive-based, the
categories covered by hate crimes seem quite underinclusive.
One might therefore conclude that hate crime laws are better
explained by political pressures than by careful consideration of
which crimes are the most harmful or which reasons are the most
heinous. Boonin’s treatment of hate crimes is good insofar as he
refutes some bad arguments against hate crimes. However, his
arguments are inadequate to persuade anyone wary of enhanced
prosecution and punishment that might depend on the political
clout of the group to which the victim belongs.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Boonin argues that racial preferences in education and
employment are neither morally required (Chapter Three) nor
morally forbidden (Chapter Four). We are convinced of the
former but find Boonin’s defense of the latter deficient in two
major respects.
Boonin defends the permissibility of racial preferences
essentially by contesting the notion that there is some morally
mandatory goal that universities and employers must pursue and
that racial preferences thwart. Universities can, for example,
accept some reduction in academic quality in order to have
winning sports teams (athletic preferences) or loyal alumni
(legacy preferences). Nor must employers pursue efficiency at
the expense of other goals. Therefore, even if racial preferences
disserve one goal of universities or of employers, they may still
serve other legitimate goals. And if racial preferences serve
legitimate goals, then those who are dispreferred by their use
have no rights that are thereby violated. Hence racial
preferences are morally permissible.
One problem with this argument is that the civil rights
movement had as its target a racial preference system—one that
favored whites over blacks. If that system was morally
illegitimate, why is a racial preference system favoring other
groups any better?
Boonin attempts to deal with this objection (pp. 191–94),
but he dismisses it much too quickly. He denies that current
racial preference systems are ill-motivated, unlike those of the
Jim Crow past (p. 193); and he denies that those victimized by
present racial preferences are in the same circumstances as
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blacks victimized by preferences for whites (p. 194). The latter
point leads naturally to the topic of reparations, which we will
address in the next section. So we put it aside and deal solely
with the motivational point—that is, that racial preferences
today are well-motivated.
Let us assume that increasing “diversity,” providing role
models, and the other non-reparative rationales offered by
defenders of racial preferences are sincere and morally
permissible. These rationales would also support preferences for
whites whenever whites were underrepresented and in need of
role models (NBA basketball?), as Boonin concedes (p. 194).
But if diversity in the student body or workforce is sometimes a good thing, might homogeneity also sometimes be a
good thing? (“I hire only white workers here because white
workers are more comfortable around other white workers, and
much less afraid of inadvertently causing offense.”) If so, would
a “whites only” policy be morally permissible if motivated, not
by ill will or racial hostility, but by the (perhaps plausible)
benefits of homogeneity? The 1964 Civil Rights Act would
surely forbid such a policy, but the policy could be morally
permissible even if illegal.
Boonin points out, correctly, that there is nothing
objectionable about preferring a black for, say, the role of
Othello or for going undercover to infiltrate a black criminal
gang (pp. 181–84). By the same token, he presumably would not
object to preferring whites to play Simon Legree or to infiltrate
the Klan. The implications of Boonin’s argument go beyond
these cases, however, where one’s (apparent) race makes one
either suitable or unsuitable for the job at hand. Given what
Boonin says about affirmative action in universities, he would
have to concede the moral permissibility of racial preferences
that disserve any legitimate goal so long as they serve another.
Thus, if the military believed too few whites were going into the
armed forces because of, say, the absence of sufficient role
models, Boonin would have to conclude that the military would
be justified in preferring white applicants to otherwise better
qualified black ones.
In a world that did not have our racial history, Boonin’s
argument might be both correct and unremarkable. Race,
however difficult to define, may in some instances be a good
proxy for traits that serve legitimate secondary and tertiary goals
of institutions. It may even sometimes be a good proxy for traits
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that serve the institution’s primary goals. But is race a good
proxy here and now, given our racial history?
We agreed with Boonin that race might be sometimes be
used to profile suspected criminals. For what hangs in the
balance for those who are profiled but are innocent is the
inconvenience, irritation, and potential embarrassment or
humiliation of a temporary interrogation, for which we
suggested they should perhaps be compensated. When it comes
to denials of jobs or admission to universities, however, the
11
stakes are much higher, compensation is out of the question,
and the role that race plays is more overt and corrosive.
Affirmative action preferences have become institutionalized in various settings, but perhaps in none so
extensively—and so much as a matter of institutional credo—as
in higher education. Boonin’s defense of affirmative action is
consequentialist and moral. If a policy is harmful on balance,
therefore, its moral standing is compromised if not refuted,
especially if those engaged in affirmative action are public
institutions using taxpayers’ dollars. Taking higher education as
a prominent example, then, and considering affirmative action as
it is actually carried out at American colleges and universities, it
seems to us that the consequentialist scorecard is considerably
12
less encouraging than Boonin suggests.
What are the benefits and costs of affirmative action? Some
students who are admitted (and some faculty members who are
hired) on an affirmative action basis are surely benefitted: in the
case of students, young people who would not have attended an
elite university but for racial preference, yet having been
admitted, go on to achieve success in school and beyond. There
is evidence, however, that many students who are “beneficiaries”
of affirmative action suffer significantly—both educationally and
in other ways—from institutional mismatch: having been
admitted with notably lesser qualifications than other students,
they do less well, not only than their better qualified classmates,
but then they themselves would do on a campus where their
qualifications were nearer the mean. In disproportionate
numbers, they fail to graduate or to qualify professionally. They
11. What would “compensate” one who is denied admission to the school of his or
her choice because of race? Perhaps the monetary equivalent of the lost value, or
admission to an equally good school. But these are not feasible nor available.
12. The consequentialist criterion is in counterpoise to the thought, sometimes
attributed to the late Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald of Ireland, that “That’s all right
in practice, but will it work in theory?”
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also gravitate away from rigorous courses of study, scientific and
otherwise, which they might pursue successfully at institutions
13
where their qualifications were not compromised. As a further
counterweight to the benefit that preferences might provide to
those preferred: there would, of course, be other students and
faculty who would have been admitted and hired and thus
benefitted, but for the preferences. To this extent, the benefits
for those preferred are offset by the benefits forgone by others
as a result of affirmative action.
Advocates of preferences cite racial diversity as an
academic benefit to all students—not just to those preferred—
and to the educational enterprise as a whole. Suffice it to say
that we think the academic benefits of racial preferences are
speculative at best. Intellectual diversity on a faculty is a good
thing, we believe, and it is probably a good thing in a student
body. It is conceivable that geographic diversity, too, or diversity
of parents’ occupations might marginally contribute to students’
knowledge in a valuable way (as compared to a student body
admitted more nearly on the academic merits); but the benefit, if
any, is uncertain. The idea of geographic diversity was originally
developed at elite universities to limit the number of Jewish
students: its “intellectual” justification was a fig leaf. It seems to
us that race, likewise, is a poor proxy for promoting genuine
intellectual diversity or for ascertaining whether a given
student’s admission will benefit other students or the academic
goals of a college or university.
Racial preferences in higher education are said to produce
broader social benefits as well. They are said to provide role
models for minority young people, to provide highly-trained
graduates who will serve under-served minority communities,
and to foster greater inter-racial understanding and cooperation.
We accept that if racial preferences generate these effects, then
to that extent their consequences are positive. The evidence that
they do so is at best uncertain, however. The importance of role
models of a particular race or ethnicity, and the numbers that are
desirable as such, are speculative and controversial. Likewise for
whether and to what extent minority communities benefit from
the services of those admitted preferentially. And certainly
likewise for whether preferences foster inter-racial understanding and cooperation, or rather the reverse.
13. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
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In considering benefits and costs, of course, even if racial
preferences in academic admissions and faculty hiring have some
positive effects, these must be weighed against the negative
effects. It seems to us that the negative consequences are much
clearer than the positive ones.
The most obvious negative consequence is that the most
academically qualified student body and faculty are forgone.
That is surely a social cost, although it is difficult to quantify its
magnitude. It is not, however, the only social cost of racial
preferences.
One further cost is the perpetuation of racial consciousness.
Humans are one inter-breeding species, the division of which
into races is, from a biological point of view, quite arbitrary. The
civil rights movement in the era of its major triumphs marched
on the principle that race, both biologically and sociologically,
was a shallow and irrelevant distinction, and that, in Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s words, we should be judged by the content of
our character, not the color of our skin. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 embodied the principle that race should be abandoned as a
criterion upon which individuals’ fortunes turned. Racial
preferences teach a different lesson. One’s race is important. It
can get one into a school or on its faculty, or it can stand in one’s
way in these respects. Race is not an arbitrary, superficial, and
irrelevant characteristic within a common humanity. Rather,
14
race to some considerable extent is destiny.
The negative effects of this on campuses are plain to see.
Students admitted because of their race, who are less qualified
academically, tend not to integrate but to segregate. That is an
understandable defense mechanism, but it works against the
“promotion of understanding” diversity rationale.
Another negative consequence of racial preferences—both
in student admissions and in faculty hiring—is the creation of
ghettoized academic departments: what are sometimes called
“grievance studies” departments. These departments tend not to
be rigorous and disinterested but rather to be polemical,
partisan, and grievance generating. They disproportionately
attract preferentially admitted students, as a kind of safe haven.

14. Universities must now dust off the racial codes of the old South, of South
Africa, or of Nazi Germany in order to have at hand formal definitions of “races” to
make sure that the wrong people don’t claim racial preferences. And given the
arbitrariness of racial definitions, they will not be able to escape the charge of
arbitrariness in employing those definitions, let alone the obnoxiousness of doing so.
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These departments, their faculty and their students, tend to be
among the more ardent advocates of the hate speech codes and
of the norms of political correctness that Boonin dislikes: not so
much to defend against wounding and silencing as to stifle the
speech of those who might oppose affirmative action or who
might dare to point out that admission standards have been
lowered.
Moreover, because no one likes to be admitted under
“lowered” standards, affirmative action tends to have two
additional negative consequences. The first is the debasement of
honest dialogue: students or faculty members are not “less
qualified” but rather are “differently qualified.” Second, and
relatedly, the fear of being considered less qualified generates
attacks on the academic norms by which qualifications are
gauged. Legitimate norms are claimed to be no better at
determining academic mettle than “different”—racially or
ideologically freighted—norms.
The extent of these negative effects of affirmative action is
obviously controversial. We write about them as long-time
denizens of universities, without illusions about proving them
conclusively to the satisfaction of everyone. But neither have the
claimed beneficial effects of affirmative action been proved. We
think the negative effects we have cited are more probable than
the positive ones. In any event, we do not believe the morality of
affirmative action can be determined without considering these
effects. Boonin is correct that dispreferred students have no
moral “right” that institutions should serve goals for which they
happen to be qualified. And he is correct that institutions such as
universities may morally permissibly serve a plurality of goals.
But these considerations do not show that morality is indifferent
to the consequences of the pursuit of those goals. It seems to us
that Boonin fails to confront the negative consequences of racial
preferences which he claims to be morally permissible.
Racial preferences, in reality, were first adopted and
justified as a form of reparations. The constitutionality of that
justification was undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
15
decision in Bakke, and only then did “diversity” become the
new and constitutionally more defensible rationale. We believe,
however, that diversity has always been a legal fig leaf, and that
the reparative goal is what has always motivated the use of racial
15. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (denying the constitutionality of the use of racial preferences by a University of California medical school).
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preferences. So it is to Boonin’s treatment of reparations that we
now turn.
V. REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY
Boonin’s chapters on reparations for slavery are the first
two substantive chapters of the book, and they are by far the
longest. Boonin claims that he was at one time persuaded by
16
David Horowitz’s critique of the case for reparations but then,
upon careful if not agonizing reappraisal, came to the opposite
conclusion, namely that the case for reparations was compelling.
He does not address the form reparations should take, but he
does believe reparations in some form are owed to blacks
Americans.
Boonin’s argument for reparations consists of five steps.
Here is how Boonin describes them and the conclusions they
justify.
Step one—the compensation principle: if a government
wrongfully harms someone as a result of the authorized
actions of some of its public officials, then it incurs a moral
obligation to compensate its victim for the harms that it has
wrongfully caused.
Step two—the historical claim: in the past, the U.S.
government wrongfully harmed previous generations of
Africans and African Americans by supporting the institution
of slavery and subsequent forms of legalized segregation and
discrimination.
Step three—the causal claim: the acts by which the U.S.
government wrongfully harmed previous generations of
Africans and African Americans by supporting the institution
of slavery and subsequent forms of legalized segregation and
discrimination in the past continue to cause harmful
consequences for the currently living generation of black
Americans today.
Step four—the surviving public obligation principle: if a
government incurs a moral obligation as a result of the
authorized actions of some of its public officials then this
obligation doesn’t cease to exist when the officials in question
die.
Step five—the unpaid balance claim: the U.S. government has
16. See DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (Encounter Books, 2002).
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not yet fully compensated the currently living generation of
black Americans for the harmful consequences they continue
to incur as a result of slavery and its aftermath.
It seems to me that all five of these steps must be accepted,
and on grounds that opponents of slave reparations themselves already accept. It also seems to me that if all five of
these steps must be accepted, then the reparations position
itself must be accepted: the first two steps justify an obligation
on the part of the past government to past black Americans,
the third justifies extending the obligation from one owed to
past black Americans to one owed to present black
Americans, the fourth justifies extending the obligation from
one owed by the past government to one owed by the present
government, and the fifth justifies the conclusion that the
present government’s obligation has not yet been fully
discharged. Since each of the steps taken individually seem to
be justified, and since all of the steps taken together seem to
justify the conclusion, the conclusion itself seems to be
justified: the U.S. government does indeed have a moral
obligation to benefit the currently living generation of black
Americans because of the wrongful harms that were inflicted
on past generations of Africans and African Americans by the
institution of slavery and its aftermath (pp. 53–54).

Very fairly, Boonin quotes at some length from David
Horowitz’s ten-point case against reparations. Among
Horowitz’s points are (Point 1) there is no single group
responsible for the crime of slavery (from whom reparation
should be sought); (Point 3) only a minority of white Americans
owned slaves, while others gave their lives to free them; (Point
6) the reparations argument is based on the unsubstantiated
claim that all African Americans suffer from the economic
consequences of slavery and discrimination; (Point 7) the
reparations claim sends a damaging message to the African
American community of victimhood and alienation; and (Point
9) slavery, which traditionally existed in all societies, was
brought to an end largely at the initiative of the Anglo-American
anti-slavery movement, and would not have ended in America
when it did, were it not for the sacrifices of American soldiers
and an American President who gave his life to sign the
Emancipation Proclamation.
Boonin rejects all of Horowitz’s points summarily—too
summarily, we think. It seems to us that Boonin underestimates
some of the difficulties implicit in his own argument; and more
broadly, that there are questions of practical wisdom which he
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fails to consider, and which militate against the idea of racial
reparations today.
Boonin stipulates (Step Two of his argument) that the U.S.
government harmed previous generations of African Americans
by supporting slavery and post-slavery discrimination. But
slavery was lawful in the British colonies in America prior to
American Independence, and in other British colonies for some
years thereafter. It was lawful in the newly independent
American states under the Articles of Confederation, when the
states were virtually sovereign countries. It remained lawful
under the laws of some states after the ratification of the
Constitution. As is generally recognized, there probably would
not have been a United States had the Constitution attempted to
disestablish slavery in the states.
Boonin has two responses to this point. The first is to argue
that the non-slave states could have adopted a Constitution and
created a smaller country, one without the slave states in it. In
this way, the United States could have avoided wronging the
slaves. But had it done so, essentially washing its hands of the
problem of slavery, slavery might have persisted in the southern
states long after it was in fact eliminated.
Boonin’s second response is to distinguish wrongness from
culpability. Even if the Framers were not culpable for not
abolishing slavery—because they could not have done so—their
17
failing to do so was nonetheless a wrong. An alternate view,
however, is that “ought must imply can.” If the United States
could not have abolished slavery at the outset without being
stillborn as a country, but later—when the loyalties built up by
the nation and the “mystic chords of memory” made it
possible—incurred civil war and the loss of hundreds of
thousands of its citizens’ lives in order to abolish it, then the
initial acquiescence in slavery can plausibly be said not only not
to have been culpable (as Boonin concedes) but also not wrong,
at least not in the sense of a wrong that calls for further
18
reparations centuries later.
17. Boonin seems to suggest that the government’s acquiescing in wrongs that it
cannot prevent is itself a wrong. But to state such a position is to see its absurdity. The
government of the United States today “acquiesces”—by declining to intervene—in
countless horrible brutalities around the globe, brutalities that it cannot eradicate, if at
all, without sacrificing considerable blood and treasure. Such acquiescence cannot
plausibly count as a wrong. Or if it is, then all of us are guilty of countless such “wrongs,”
and the charge that we are loses all sting.
18. Boonin does not discuss the wrongs of the slave states and their potential
obligations with respect to reparations. Given the mobility of the black population over
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Boonin’s Step Three, the causal claim, is problematic as
well. Boonin’s argument is that the only explanation for why
black Americans on average are faring worse than other
Americans on average must be because of the past wrongs of
slavery, Jim Crow, and discrimination.
The emphasis on a group’s lower-than-average welfare, of
course, deflects attention from the members of the group who
are not worse off than the national average: in the case of black
Americans, a significant African-American middle and upper
middle class. On a “causality” argument, it is not clear why
people in this category are owed reparations. Moreover, even
the lower-than-average welfare of a group as a whole might not
be so easily attributable to any single cause or set of causes.
Over the course of a century and a half since the abolition of
slavery, a great many intervening causes have had time to
develop. Moreover, groups—however defined—do not have the
same average outcomes in life, even in the absence of invidious
discrimination. Almost any group is likely to be either above or
below average: whether the group is defined by race, ethnicity,
religion, or virtually any other criterion.
Boonin suggests that reparations need not consist of
payments to individual black Americans. Rather, Boonin
proposes that reparations can consist of payments to
organizations and schools that are “predominately black” (p.
126). He points out that Germany’s form of reparations for the
Holocaust has been to give money to the State of Israel, even
though not everyone who benefits is Jewish and not every Jew is
benefitted. Boonin believes this provides a model for reparations
for slavery, even though black Americans have no “state” or
corporate form.

time and the migration of many blacks to the North and West, the reparations arguments
would be enormously more complex at the state level than at the federal level. In any
event, because Boonin does not consider state liability, neither shall we.
Could Boonin have built his case for reparations by the U.S. government on Jim
Crow rather than on slavery? Could he have argued, in effect, that although the U.S.
government could not have ended slavery until the Civil War, it could have or prevented
the enactment of Jim Crow laws immediately thereafter? One question is whether the
Fourteenth Amendment did outlaw Jim Crow laws, and the Supreme Court mistakenly
held otherwise in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the racial
segregation, by law, of railroad cars in Louisiana). (What is the responsibility of the U.S.
government for an erroneous constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court?) If the
Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw Jim Crow, could it have been ratified had it done
so? If it could not been ratified, is the U.S. government nonetheless responsible for the
racial harms of the Jim Crow era? Again, because Boonin does not take up these
questions, neither shall we.
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There are further causation problems, however. One is that
but for the wrongful policies of the past, many or most black
people the United States today would not exist, because those
wrongs affected who had children with whom, and when. Had
slavery ended when the United States began, there undoubtedly
would be black people living in America today; and if Boonin is
correct, they would, as a group, be better off than black
Americans, as a group, are today. But these black Americans
would be different individuals from those who are today’s black
Americans. The latter would not exist but for the past wrongs
such as slavery.
A lot of philosophical ink has been spilt on this general
topic. How can future generations be wronged by policies that
affect their identity, and but for which they would not exist?
Boonin argues that most people—even those inclined to
oppose reparations—would support compensation to those
blinded by wrongful pollution, even if the people in question
would not have come into existence but for the pollution (pp.
109–10). Hence, the “non-identity” problem should not be a
barrier to compensation for wrongs.
Yet Boonin rightly senses that to make the case for
reparations air tight, which is his ambition, he cannot so easily
dismiss the non-identity problem. Therefore, Boonin goes on to
present another case that he believes is a convincing one for
compensation even in the face of the non-identity problem. In
this case a child, Charlie, is born blind because of the effects of
pollution on his parents. Moreover, the pollution affected the
time of his conception, so that in its absence, a different child
would have been conceived. Charlie would not have existed but
for the wrongful pollution; therefore, his blindness cannot be a
worsening of his condition. Charlie’s blindness would be
reversible, however, but for the lingering effects of the pollution,
which impede recovery. In such a case, Boonin argues, the
polluter would owe Charlie compensation, not for his being born
blind, but rather for his continued blindness due to the lingering
toxic effects of the pollution. And likewise, black Americans can
be owed reparations for the harmful lingering effects of past
wrongs even if the very existence of the people in question is a
product of those wrongs (pp. 110–11).
We think the non-identity problem might not be refuted so
easily. Boonin assumes Charlie in his example would definitely
have a valid moral claim based on the present effects of the
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pollution that led to his very existence. If the pollution and its
after-effects are a package deal—with one you get the other—
then the after-effects are as much a condition of Charlie’s
existence as the initial pollution. Boonin admits that if Charlie’s
blindness were irreversible, the non-identity problem would
stand in the way of his claim that the pollution was a wrong to
him. Why, then, is he wronged by its after-effects, even if in their
absence his blindness could have been cured?
The point can be made another way. Suppose a demon
offers you life with irreversible blindness from birth. That is the
only way he’ll grant you life. If your life would still be worth
living, you’ll take the deal.
Now suppose the demon changes the deal to this extent.
He’ll offer you life with otherwise reversible blindness that he
will prevent being reversed. You are no worse off under this deal
than you were under the previous one, so you’ll take it. And if,
after having been born blind, you are prevented by the demon
from curing it, you cannot claim the demon is wronging you. A
deal is a deal, and you, not the demon, are the one attempting to
renege.
Others have attempted to get around the non-identity
problem in the context of reparations by basing reparations on
wrongs to the slaves themselves, not their descendants. The
argument is that the slaves would have wanted what was owed
them in compensation to go to their descendants whoever they
might be. Perhaps this is a better theory, and a more tenable
argument for reparations. But it is not the theory that Boonin
adopts. Boonin’s theory founders on the non-identity problem:
his Step Three, and with it his case for reparations, fails.
Some might argue that in addition to the non-identity
problem, there is another problem with Boonin’s Step Three
causal claim. It concerns the way that the past wrongs of slavery
and Jim Crow are presently causing many blacks to fare poorly.
Boonin thinks that it plausible that America’s past racial
wrongs cause present harms to black Americans by having
spawned an underclass subculture that is dysfunctional in the
modern social and economic environment. He cites works by
John McWhorter and Shelby Steele which describe that culture
19
and how it probably arose. The dysfunctional aspects of that
19. See JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK
AMERICA (2001); SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF
BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1998).
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subculture are well known: high illegitimacy rates; antiintellectualism (deprecating “acting White”); and high crime
rates, with high levels of violence. We think this subculture’s
contribution to social and economic problems in the black
20
community is more than plausible. Indeed, Boonin implies that
he might agree.
Boonin believes that slavery and Jim Crow contributed to
the creation of this troubled subculture. We shall assume Boonin
is correct on this point, though there is some reason to be
skeptical. The spread of the “oppositional” culture of the late
1960s and early 1970s surely played a big role, as have other
more recent changes in the general culture, some of which may
be the unintended effects of the Great Society welfare programs
and their successors; for the differences between black and white
Americans with respect to family, education, and crime were
considerably smaller in the 1950s than they are today.
Even if Boonin is correct about the causal antecedents of
the underclass subculture, those making the argument we are
considering would object to Boonin’s conclusion that the past
wrongs are responsible for the individual choices that constitute
and perpetuate that culture. They would point to the law’s
treatment of voluntary acts. Such acts are generally (though not
universally) held to be “intervening, superseding causes” that
“break the causal chains” that otherwise link the results of those
21
acts with the acts’ causal antecedents. They would point to the
law’s refusal to recognize so-called “cultural defenses,” whether
for Muslim honor killings or for the crimes of gangbangers.
Moreover, they might argue, the law is correct in doing this, for
it dignifies people by not viewing them as helpless captives of
their cultural mores. They are not “blaming the victim” but
dignifying people who make moral (or immoral) choices.

20. We should not be taken to be denying that there are many attractive features
of so-called “black culture.” What we are claiming is that certain aspects of that culture—
the aspects that are in direct opposition to traditional middle-class values—and the
multitude of individual choices that constitute and perpetuate those aspects of black
culture, produce a lower than average income, a poorer than average academic
performance, and a higher than average crime rate. Neither do we deny that these
aspects of the culture may even have been adaptive and functional during the slavery and
Jim Crow eras; nevertheless, they are highly maladaptive and dysfunctional today.
21. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 195 (6th ed. 2012).
Michael Moore rejects the idea that causal chains are “broken” by voluntary choices, but
he does believe those intervening choices attenuate the causal responsibility of acts
antecedent to those choices. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
249–323 (2009).
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This second argument against Step Three, however, is one
that we believe is too strong. The law’s treatment of cultural
causation may be correct for the law’s purposes, but it is too
stark and one-sided to rebut Boonin’s causal claim. It may be
possible to choose in opposition to the norms of one’s
community, but it will often be so difficult that responsibility for
choosing in accord with those norms is surely diminished if not
totally extinguished. Moreover, because community norms are
usually implanted in childhood, when the information, critical
skills, and motivational strength necessary to reject them is
absent, it is unduly harsh to regard the later choices that
constitute and perpetuate those norms as fully voluntary and
responsible. We conclude that Boonin’s Step Three fails because
of the non-identity problem, but not because of the law’s notion
of intervening, superseding causes.
Despite the failure of Boonin’s Step Three, his causal step,
many will agree with him that not only were slavery and postemancipation Jim Crow laws great evils, but also that they ought
to be but have not been atoned, and that reparations are owed.
So let us look then briefly at Boonin’s Step Five, his unpaid
balance claim.
It seems to us Boonin is facile in rejecting the idea that
American society has already gone a great distance in making
reparation. The Civil War itself meant, in Lincoln’s words, that
America would pay for “every drop of blood drawn with the
lash” with “another drawn by the sword”. Since the midtwentieth century, America not only enacted comprehensive
laws outlawing racial discrimination, it also adopted wideranging social policies whose goals and raisons d’etre clearly
amounted to reparation. These include social welfare programs
that black Americans would be disproportionately eligible for—
programs openly motivated at least in large part by bad
conscience about past racial injustice—as well as the growth of
affirmative action in virtually all the important institutions of
American life. The reparations have been spiritual as well as
material: the adoption of Martin Luther King, Jr. as a national
hero, and the emphasis in many school curricula on Civil Rights
history, sometimes virtually to the exclusion of other aspects of
American history. Boonin’s suggestion that social welfare
programs adopted in the Civil Rights era cannot be regarded as
reparations because black Americans were not the exclusive
beneficiaries is unconvincing: as though German reparations to
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Jewish victims would not “count” if the reparations were offered
to Roma or to other victims as well.
Boonin’s other rejoinder to David Horowitz and others who
maintain that reparations have already in effect been made is
that whatever has been done is not enough because it has not
succeeded: the welfare of black Americans, on average, is still
less than that of white Americans on average. But this thought is
double edged. As we suggested, and as Boonin acknowledges,
various observers consider that many of the social programs that
gathered momentum in the 1960s, including welfare programs
and affirmative action, tended to aggravate rather than to
mitigate the condition of many black Americans: by fostering
family collapse, dependency, alienation, and disassimilation. We
incline to that view ourselves, although Boonin presumably does
not. Boonin’s conclusion is that more reparations are necessary.
But in practice, further programs in the name of reparations
would almost certainly resemble the redistributive and
preferential programs which may have done, as Boonin
grudgingly acknowledges—or which did in fact, as we believe—
more harm than good. In short, the case for reparations seems to
be that the late-twentieth century remedies made things worse,
so let us have more of them.
Boonin’s case for reparations takes little account of such
questions of phronesis or practical wisdom. Reparations can be a
destructive remedy, especially inasmuch as they might reinforce
the sense of victimhood, grievance, and alienation which have
been fostered—in many cases surely with the best of
intentions—by public policy and by broader cultural forces over
the past half century. This was an era in which the Civil Rights
revolution did away with pervasive racial discrimination and
segregation; and in which many black Americans, probably a
majority, became members of the broad American middle class.
But it was also an era of growing social dysfunction among other
parts of the black community: greatly increased rates of
illegitimacy, family breakdown, educational failure, drugs, and
violence.
Amy Wax has written eloquently about how those who have
been injured by wrongdoing must themselves take painful
measures in order to recover, measures that cannot be
22
undertaken by the wrongdoers no matter how willing. A person
22. AMY L. WAX, RACE, WRONGS, AND REMEDIES: GROUP JUSTICE IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2009).
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injured in an auto accident that was the fault of the other driver
can have his lost income and the cost of his medical treatments
compensated by the wrongdoer. At some point, however, he will
have to undergo painful rehabilitative measures in order to
recover fully. The wrongdoer cannot undergo those measures for
him. The victim can perhaps be compensated for the pain he
must endure to recover, but he cannot avoid the pain itself and
hope to recover.
Racial reparations, at this historical juncture, might actually
worsen the condition of those for whom they are meant to be
reparative: for they will not eradicate the dysfunctional culture
but are liable to reinforce it. The best reparations might instead
be a sober effort to alter that culture.
VI. CONCLUSION
We admire Boonin’s effort to take an open-minded tone
about these controversial racial topics and especially his
willingness to consider arguments that might be thought
“politically incorrect.” Although we have disagreed with Boonin
on various points, we think this book is both provocative and
serious. We give one and one-half cheers for Should Race
Matter?

